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SECURITIES REGULATION-NONDISCLOSURE OF INSIDE IN-
FORMATION WHICH WOULD HAVE HAD SUBSTANTIAL IMPACT
ON MARKET HELD VIOLATIVE OF SECURITIES LAWS; RELEASE
OF MATERIAL INFORMATION TO NEWS MEDIA CONSTITUTES
FULL DISCLOSURE. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. (S.D.N.Y.
1966).
In 1959, an exploration group in the employ of Texas Gulf Sul-
phur Company conducted aerial geophysical surveys over a Canadian
area. Pursuant to the acquisition of several parcels of the surveyed
land, the Company, between November 8, 1963 and April 15, 1964,
conducted eight test drillings for sulphides. These tests revealed
substantial deposits of minerals. During this period, certain directors,
officers and employees of the Company purchased stock and calls on
stock of Texas Gulf Sulphur; made recommendations to acquaint-
ances concerning the purchase of the Company's securities; and
accepted stock options in accordance with the Company's Stock
Option Incentive Plan. On April 12, the Company issued a press
release which minimized the results of the mining tests. On April
16, Texas Gulf Sulphur announced to the news media the discovery
of a new copper mine.
The Securities and Exchange Commission instituted action1 against
the Company and these directors, officers and employees for alleged
violations of Section 10 (b) 2 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and Rule lob-54 promulgated thereunder. The basis for the charge
1 The action was brought pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21 (e),
48 Stat. 900 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1964), which authorizes the
Commission to institute actions to enjoin existing or imminent violations of the act and
to enforce any obligation or liability arising from the act or the rules and regulations
enacted in its pursuance. Section 27 of the act, 48 Stat. 902 (1934), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 78aa (1964), grants exclusive jurisdiction of such actions to the district courts
of the United States.
2 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any se-
curity registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so regis.
tered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
8 48 Stat. 881 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1964).
4 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1964).
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange.
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
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against Texas Gulf Sulphur was the issuance of an allegedly false
and misleading press release regarding the mining developments in
Canada. The tripartite foundation for the charge against the indi-
vidual defendants lay in (1) the use of material information con-
cerning these developments-prior to their being publicly disclosed
and absorbed-to purchase the stock or the calls on stock; (2) the
recommendation of such purchases to acquaintances; and (3) the
acceptance of the stock options without revealing this information
to the Directors' Committee which had granted the options. The
defendants' actions, the Commission contended, were tantamount to
engaging in a "course of business" which operated "as a fraud or
deceit" upon the stockholders of the Company.5
Upon trial before the district court, sitting without a jury, held:
Two of the individual defendants, a secretary and an engineer, had
violated section 10 (b) and rule lob-5 by purchasing shares of Texas
Gulf Sulphur stock at a time when the undisclosed information of
the drilling tests was "material." The activities of the other indi-
vidual defendants had taken place either before the information had
attained the degree of materiality or after the Company had made
the announcement of the new mine. Further, since there was no
showing by the SEC that the press release of April 14 had been made
"in connection with the purchase or sale of any security,"6 the Com-
pany was not found to have violated the securities enactments. SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
The majority view espoused by the common law deemed the cor-
porate insider to be a fiduciary only of the corporation; no duty was
imposed upon him to disclose information when transacting pur-
chases or sales in his company's stock. Failure to divulge known
facts affecting stock value would not, therefore, give rise to a cause
of action.7 The severity of this view, and the cognizance of the need
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the drcumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
5 Id. at subsection (c). The court, in footnote 7 of its opinion, stated that no dis-
tinction among the three subsections was made by the Commission either in its brief or
at trial. However, as no evidence was offered to show that the defendants used "any
device, scheme, or artifice" as proscribed by subsection (a) or made any representation
prohibited by subsection (b), the court applied subsection (c). When a violation of
the rule is alleged, no particular subsection need be invoked. List v. Fashion Park, Inc.,
340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
6 Rule lob-5 supra note 4.
7 Hooker v. Midland Steel Co., 215 Ill. 444, 74 N.E. 445 (1905); Walsh v.
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to redress injuries suffered from such corporate practices, gave impe-
tus to a minority doctrine. The courts adhering to this view placed
the insider in a fiduciary relation to the stockholders, thus requiring
disclosure of all pertinent facts that would affect a party's judgment
in a securities transaction."
A third group of courts accepted an intermediary position, look-
ing upon the insider as not having a fiduciary duty in every transac-
tion which was undertaken, but, nonetheless, imposing upon him an
obligation in "special circumstances" to reveal information acquired
by virtue of his position.
Under both the common-law minority view and the "special cir-
cumstances" or "special facts" doctrine, as it is better known, the
want of disclosure, when necessary, amounted to fraud.10 It has been
averred that, in actuality, the majority position at common law has
been emasculated by its gradual envelopment within the "special
facts" doctrine, with the latter becoming barely discernible from the
minority concept."1 Though the "special facts" doctrine does not pur-
port to accept the presence of a fiduciary relationship between in-
siders and stockholders, it "is manifestly based on the existence of
a relationship between [them] . . . which is different from the
relationship between arm's-length traders."'
2
Prior to the enactment of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, it
appears that the United States Senate considered insiders as occupy-
ing a position of trust and confidence. The marked increase in
unscrupulous speculative ventures by corporate directors, officers and
Goulden, 130 Mich. 531, 90 N.W. 406 (1902); Carpenter v. Danforth, 52 Barb. 581
(N.Y. 1868); see Smith v. Hurd, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 371 (1847) (The dictum in
this case has been cited as providing the foundation for this view.).
8 Oliver v. Oliver, 188 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903); Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 136
Kan. 530, 16 P.2d 531 (1932); Jacquith v. Mason, 99 Neb. 509, 156 N.W. 1041
(1916); see 19 CORNELL, L.Q. 103 (1933).
9 Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909); Bollstrom v. Duplex Power Car Co., 208
Mich. 15, 175 N.W. 492 (1919); Poole v. Camden, 79 W.Va. 310, 92 S.E. 454
(1916).
10 See cases cited notes 8 and 9 supra. In the "special facts" landmark decision,
Strong v. Repide, the Supreme Court determined that the defendant-insider's position
established sufficient facts to create liability. As a director of a corporation, he had
negotiated for the sale of its assets; due to his position, he knew better than others the
stock value to be achieved by such a sale. Consequently, his nondisclosure of this fact,
when buying securities, effected a breach of duty which was fiduciary in nature by rea-
son of his position. The "special facts" giving rise to similar obligations were no more
strictly interpreted in other cases. III Loss, SEcuRrrIEs REGULATION 1447-48 (2d ed.
1961).




major stockholders was deemed violative of "fiduciary" principles.'
The use of undisclosed material information by insiders instilled in
Congress a desire to safeguard the minority shareholders' interests,
thus prompting, in part, the enactment of the 1934 legislation.' 4
Although broad in scope, the act left the Commission, its created
administrative body, devoid of an effective provision to deter fraud-
ulent practices involving persons other than brokers. To rectify this
inadequacy, the SEC promulgated rule lOb-5,1 5 which expressly covers
purchases or sales "by any person."'16
The Texas Gulf Sulphur court adhered to the "special facts" doc-
trine, and applied it to the rule and section 10 (b) of the act. Using
material information, which remains undisclosed to minority share-
holders, was held to be clearly within those unique circumstances
that invoke the relationship closely paralleling that ofa fiduciary.
To gain financially, at the expense of those to whom loyalty is due,
is most certainly proscribed by these securities provisions.
The issues that confronted the Texas Gulf Sulphur court, in deter-
mining whether section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 had been violated,
were (1) whether the individual defendants were insiders; (2)
whether the section and the rule apply only to privity transactions
or whether they also encompass trading on the national exchanges;
(3) whether the information used by the defendants was actually
material in content; (4) whether buying Texas Gulf Sulphur secu-
18 Report of Com. on Banking & Currency, Stock Exchange Practices, S. REP. No.
1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934).
14 The principal purposes of the act were to control securities trading by insuring
the disclosure of information to purchasers or sellers; to avert fraud in securities trans-
actions by providing a remedy therefor; to govern practices in the securities markets;
and to regulate the amount of national credit which flows into these markets. I Loss,
op. cit supra note 10, at 130-31.
15 Note, 59 HARv. L. REV. 769, 770 (1946). Antecedent to the rule, the only legis-
lative weapons against fraud in the purchase or sale of securities were found in Section
17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, which was limited to purchases only; and section
15(c) of the 1934 act, which proscribed fraudulent dealings by brokers in over-the-
counter operations. The purpose of the rule, therefore, was to protect buyers and
sellers from not only corporate insiders but from anyone who perpetrated a fraud.
Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
956 (1952) ; see III Loss, op. cit. supra note 10, at 1469.
10 The SEC initially rendered an opinion applying rule 10b-5 in Ward La France
Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943), which involved the purchasing of corporate secur-
ities by officers for the corporation itself. These individuals neither notified the stock-
holders from whom they purchased that merger negotiations were being conducted, nor
disclosed to them that the corporation was the buyer. The Commission held that such
actions were clearly transgressive of the rule. The first judicial decision concerning the
provision was Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947),
wherein the court adjudged insiders' nondisclosure of a previous sale of corporate
assets as a violation.
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rities immediately after the official announcement of the new mine
was permissible; and (5) whether the Company's press release of
April 14 violated section 10(b) and rule lob-S.' 7
Historically, the term "insider" has been applied solely to direc-
tors, officers and major stockholders.' 8 However, since section 10 (b)
refers to "any person," one not holding an enumerated position may,
in certain instances, be considered an insider.10 These instances would
cover situations where people acquire material information in the
scope of their employment, thereby placing themselves in a position
of trust and confidence toward the shareholders-a position analo-
gous to that of a fiduciary.20 Consequently, "insiders" may include
employees as well as corporate dignitaries.
Since one of the purposes of the securities legislation was to afford
protection to the ordinary purchaser who deals primarily on the open
market,21 liability under section 10 (b) and rule lob-5 must extend to
17 Texas Gulf Sulphur was a case of first impression regarding (1) the application
of the term "insider" to those other than officers, directors and major stockholders in
suits under federal securities law; (2) the question as to extending liability under rule
lob-5 to purchases on the national exchanges; and (3) the purchasing of securities
immediately after an official announcement.
Early in its opinion, the court rejected two contentions made by the defen-
dants: (1) that the common-law elements of fraud must be shown in proving vi-
olations of section 10 (b) and rule iob-5; and (2) that any liability incurred by
insiders is limited to the sanctions provided in Section 16 of the Securties Ex-
change Act, which restricts the parties who may bring action to the corporation
and, derivatively, to the stockholders. In an apparent reversal of its own juris-
dictional requirements of proof, the court held that "recent cases" did not demand
proof of fraud, the only requisite being proof of one of the acts which is prohibited
by the securities legislation and the rules. 258 F. Supp. at 277. Accord, Stevens v.
Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965); Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d
210 (9th Cir. 1962); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961). Contra, Fischman
v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951) (requiring proof of fraud in actions
brought pursuant to section 10(b)); Weber v. C.M.P. Corp., F. Supp. 321 (S.D.
N.Y. 1951) (requiring proof of scienter); Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) (necessitating proof of causation).
This reversal stemmed from the Supreme Court's admonition that securities legisla-
tion should be construed as " 'enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds,' not tech-
nicaIly and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate . . . remedial purposes." SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963). Section 16 was held in-
applicable because it proscribes only short-swing profits realized within a six-month
period. Hence, it was enacted to force insiders to abandon short-swing speculation by
making it unprofitable, as all benefits accrue to the corporation. A section 16 action
requires both a purchase and a sale of a listed security, whereas section 10(b) encom-
passes the purchase or sale of any security, and any action thereunder may be brought
by the Commission or any party who claims to have been defrauded. 258 F. Supp. at
278.
18 See Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
19 Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
20 Brophy v. Cities Service Co., 70 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 1949).
21 Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). But see
III Loss, op. cit. supra note 10, at 1455-56.
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transactions which are conducted on the national securities exchanges.
It is not limited, therefore, to face-to-face dealings, so as to make
privity an essential element of a cause of action.
22
However, violations of section 10 (b) and the rule can only occur
when the undisclosed information is material,23 since "there is noth-
ing in the Act which precludes insiders from purchasing stock of
their company or from being beneficiaries of the company's incentive
stock option plan. [Moreover] . ..it is important under our free
enterprise system that insiders ...be encouraged to own securities
of their company." 24 It is only when an insider uses unrevealed in-
formation which is qualitatively material to his own personal advan-
tage that he incurs liability. Resolving the question of materiality is
without doubt the crucial factor in deciding alleged violations of
section 10(b) and rule lob-5.
The test for determining materiality, it has been said, is whether
disclosure of the information would affect the other party's "invest-
ment judgment,"' 25 or whether it would alter the market value of
the company's stock.28 Although this tenet of materiality is notably
well accepted, its application to existing facts has not always been
uniform.
2 7
In applying materiality to the facts in the principal case, the court
felt constrained to proceed conservatively, since "many actions under
22 See List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 461-62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 811 (1965). The court in the principal case rejected the defendants' assertion that,
on a stock exchange, it would be impossible for insiders to contact the party or parties
with whom they were trading, noting as evident that there are methods of disclosure
other than that of personal notification. As the Commission has expressed: "It would
be anomalous indeed if the protection afforded by the anti-fraud provisions were with-
drawn from transactions effected on exchanges, primary markets for securities trans-
actions." Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 914 (1961).
23 List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
811 (1965).
24 258 F. Supp. at 280.
25 Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961).
26 Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963); see Speed v. Trans-
america Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951), aff'd, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956).
27 In Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909), knowledge of present negotiations
for the sale of corporate assets was held to constitute material information; contrarily,
in James Blackstone Memorial Library Ass'n v. Gulf, Mobile 'and Ohio R.R., 264 F.2d
445 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 815 (1959), negotiations for such a sale were
not construed as a basis for materiality. This later view appears to be adverse to the
application given by the SEC in Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943),
in which the Commission deemed as violative of rule 10b-5 the nondisclosure of merger
negotiations. But see Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate Information Practices:
The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REV. 1271, 1289-90
(1965). The author expresses the opinion that the distinction lies in the degree, in-
tensity and stage of the negotiations.
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Section 10(b) are brought on the basis of hindsight.' "8 The obli-
gation to disclose corporate facts should be limited to those unique
situations where disclosure would substantially affect the market price
of the security.29 A less conservative interpretation than this would
only place an onerous duty upon management, greatly retarding its
securities transactions.30 This "substantial impact" test was consistent
with the trial testimony of geophysicists, mining engineers and secu-
rity analysts, who felt that the first two test drillings, although whet-
ting the interest of the insiders, could not be the basis of a prediction
as to the actual discovery of a mine. In addition, "from an invest-
ment point of view no significance could be attached to the results
of a single drill hole, however rich."3' 1 Furthermore, the court held
that the "results of [the second test] . . . added to the information
previously known but did not constitute material information."
3 2
Evidently, had the public or the minority stockholders become aware
of the mineralization encountered by the second drilling, they would
not have altered the value given to the Company's stock. The results
of the first drilling test were also thought to be too "remote," i.e.,
no substantial variation in the market would have occurred upon
disclosure, in view of the range of Texas Gulf Sulphur's corporate
activity, the volume of its shares and its expansiveness.
3
In opposing this view, the Commission contended that the results
of the initial test achieved materiality as a consequence of the impor-
tance with which they were received. However, the court noted that
an insider will most assuredly have better knowledge of the prospects
of his company, and, hence, be in a better position to analyze its
developments. To proscribe securities trading based upon "educated
,guesses" would place an insider in a dilemma: Should he, in reliance
upon his educated guess, purchase stock in his company without
effecting disclosure, he would be liable if his guess were proven cor-
rect; conversely, he would be subject to action upon making a dis-
28 258 F. Supp. at 280.
29 The court relied heavily upon the wording of Fleischer, supra note 27, at 1289.
Oddly, in the article, the author believed the Texas Gulf Sulphur proceeding to be a
natural development in the application of federal securities law.
30 Ibid.
31 258 F. Supp. at 283.
32 Id. at 284.
3 Id. at 283. During the fiscal year 1963-64, Texas Gulf Sulphur was the largest
supplier of sulphur in the world. The authorized capital stock of the corporation was
15,000,000 shares, without par value. On December 31, 1963, an amount of shares in




closure which proves erroneous.3 4 The fear of legal action would
only cause a cessation of insider purchases, a result which, due to
the desirability of giving insiders an incentive, would be injurious
to corporate well-being.35
The conclusion reached as to the inculpability of the defendants'
purchases prior to the termination of the third drilling-the point
at which the information became material-was also exonerative
of the purchases made by the acquaintances who had received infor-
mation of the developments of the first and second drilling tests.
These "tippees" had not purchased Texas Gulf Sulphur stock with
the aid of material information; consequently, any advice given them
as to the ripeness of buying such stock could not be the basis of lia-
bility.3 6 Nor could the five defendants, who received the stock options
pursuant to the Company's Stock Option Incentive Plan, be held in
violation of the section and the rule. Although a stock option is a
security within the ambit of the Securities Exchange Act,3 7 and
although fraud may well be perpetrated upon a company by con-
cealing information to one's own pecuniary gain,3 8 liability in such
circumstances is founded upon materiality. Since, in the light of the
court's factual analysis, the options were accepted months before the
information waxed material, the defendants were not obligated to
reveal their knowledge of the tests.39
34 258 F. Supp. at 284.
85 Though the court did not cite authority for imposing liability in situations in-
volving erroneous educated guesses, it would most likely be found in the exceptions to
immunity from liability for misrepresentation of opinion.
The courts have developed numerous exceptions to the rule that misrepre-
sentations of opinion are not a basis for relief. Apparently all of these may be
summed up by saying that they involve situations where special circumstances
make it very reasonable or probable that the plaintiff should accept the de-
fendant's opinion and act upon it, and so justify a relaxation of the distrust
which is considered admirable between bargaining opponents. Thus where the
parties stand in a relation of trust and confidence ... it is held that reliance
upon an opinion . . . is justifiable, and relief is granted. PROSSER, TORTS §
104, at 742 (3d ed. 1964).
36 Presently, there is an issue as to whether "tippees" may be personally liable for
purchasing securities as a result of their receiving inside information. This issue was
not implicated in Texas Gulf Sulphur, as the SEC sought to impose liability for the
"tippees'" purchases upon the insider-defendants. Fleischer has stated that Cady, Rob-
erts & Co. could be construed as the genesis of "tippee" liability. Fleischer, supra note
27, at 1282-83. However, the issue remains judicially undecided.
87 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a) (10), 48 Stat. 883 (1934), 15 U.S.C.
78c(a) (10) (1964) ; see Ruckle v. Roto American Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964).
38 New Park Mining Co. v. Cranmer, 225 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
89 The defendants were granted the options on February 20, 1964. At that time
they knew only that the first drilling test had reached completion; that substantial
mineralization had been encountered; and that the corporation had begun acquiring
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In view of what was held to be the present rule, section 10 (b)
and rule 10b-5 were not adjudged proscriptive of the securities ac-
quisition which immediately followed the Company's April 16 press
announcement. Citing Cady, Roberts & Co.40 and applying the accepted
business standard, the Texas Gulf Sulphur court noted that purchas-
ing securities subsequent to an official announcement is common
procedure in the marketplace. The desire of the Commission to have
the court establish a more effective announcement rule, so as to pre-
clude the purchasing of securities before public absorption, was
thwarted by the court's decision to refrain from judicially establish-
ing a reasonable waiting period. Modifying the existing practice in
this manner would only lead to difficulties, even though it might
cause the desistance of after-announcement trading at a time when
the public has yet to absorb the information. The court hypothesized
such a modification, posing these consequent difficulties: If insiders
were to be precluded from buying securities for a definite period,
what would be the obligations of members of the news media?
Would a news representative be liable if he were to order stock after
attending the announcement conference but prior to telephoning his
editor? A similar quandary was presented with respect to wire
houses. 41 The Commission's contention that a fairer practice should
be invoked by judicial decision was deemed as leading only to dubi-
osity. Since a decision in one case would not be controlling in another
with different facts, no insider would be able to ascertain whether
he had forborne long enough from purchasing. If a more equitable
period of abstention is to be established, it was the opinion of the
Texas Gulf Sulphur court that it should originate from the SEC
itself, or, should the Commission be wary of such promulgation lest
it exceed its authority, from the legislature.42
In its final analysis, the court held that the Company had not
violated section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 by issuing its April 14 press
release.43 The SEC maintained that Texas Gulf Sulphur knew that
land for further tests. The Board of Directors was not apprised of the information,
as a body, until shortly before the April 16 press announcement. The court found
that secrecy was desirable in view of the land-acquisition program, and that nondis-
closure by the option-receiving defendants was actually for the benefit of the corpora-
tion and its stockholders. 258 F. Supp. at 292.
40 40 S.E.C. 907, 917 (1961).
41 258 F. Supp. at 288-89.
42 258 F. Supp. at 289.
43 The press release read in part:
During the past few days, the exploration activities of Texas Gulf Sulphur
in the area of Timmins, Ontario, have been widely reported in the press,
coupled with rumors of a substantial copper discovery there. These reports
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a copper mine had been unearthed, and that the press release was
materially misleading in delineating this discovery as a "prospect." 44
Though the issuance of a false press release can be violative of the
section and the rule, if its purpose is to manipulate the market value
of the company's securities to the financial advantage of the company
or its insiders,4 5 the Commission failed to evidence that such an
advantage had inured to any of the defendants as a result of the
press release, or that it had been issued with such an intent. The
court further observed that the press release resulted in no appre-
ciable market reaction, concluding that it had not been issued "in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security"-a requisite in
proving violations of rule lob-5. 4
Texas Gulf Sulphur appears to have introduced a more stringent
definition of materiality than those which have previously been ap-
plied. The "substantial impact" test, limited as it is to unique situa-
tions, is denotative of a more liberal rein for insiders in securities
transactions. It would seem that insiders under this test are no longer
required to punctiliously divulge facts which in "reasonable and
objective contemplation might affect the value of the corporation's
stock or securities . . . . 47 "Substantial impact" entails less onus
than does the demand for disclosure of information that merely
exaggerate the scale of operations, and mention plans and statistics of size
and grade of ore that are without factual basis and have evidently originated
by speculation of people not connected with TGS. The facts are as follows
Numerous prospects have been investigated by geophysical means and
a large number of selected ones have been core-drilled. . . .Most of the
areas drilled . ..have revealed either barren pyrite or graphite without
value; a few have resulted in discoveries of small or marginal sulphide ore
bodies. Recent drilling on one property . ..has led to preliminary indica-
tions that more drilling would be required for proper evaluation of this
prospect. . . .The work done to date has not been sufficient to reach definite
conclusions and any statement as to size and grade of ore would be premature
and possibly misleading. 258 F. Supp. at 292-93.
It is interesting to note that the press release termed the ore bodies "small or mar-
ginal," while the court in its opinion described the results of the tests as "substantial."
44 A prospect was defined at the trial as "a property where there is no assurance that
commercially mineable reserves exist." 258 F. Supp. at 295.
4 Freed v. Szabo Food Serv., Inc., CCH FED. Sac, L. REP. 9 91,317 (N.D. Ill.
1964).
46 Theoretically, had the press release been issued in connection with the purchase
or sale of securities, the court noted that the Commission had still not illustrated that
it was false or misleading. The experts called by Texas Gulf Sulphur were of the
opinion that the drilling tests at that time could not afford a basis for stating that
there was continuity of mineralization in the test area. Furthermore, there could be
no correlation between the results of the existing tests without further drilling. One
of the Commission's witnesses acquiesced in the proposition that disparity of opinion
could be had in the analysis of such matters. Thus, though the release appears
pessimistic when viewed with the later developments, it was neither false nor mis-
leading as dictated by the facts then existing. 258 F. Supp. at 296.
47 Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963) (Emphasis added.).
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affects the judgment of the other transacting party.48 Even though
one court has stated the disclosure test to be based upon information
which would materially affect the other party's judgment,49 the
implication of Texas Gulf Sulphur is even more restrictive.
Although it might be argued that minority stockholders should
be the recipients of any educated guess which an insider may possess,
thus allowing them to decide whether to sell at that time or wait
until the guess is proven correct or erroneous, following the logic of
Texas Gulf Sulphur -such an argument would be stultified. The
"special facts" doctrine necessarily includes materiality, and imposes
a relationship analogous to that of a fiduciary only when the insider
has information which would affect the value judgment of the minor-
ity shareholder. Obviously, since educated guesses need not be dis-
closed, according to Texas Gulf Sulphur, they cannot be viewed as
establishing a "special facts" situation.
The court in the principal case was confronted with balancing the
policy of encouraging insider investment against the need for con-
trolling profit at the expense of minority shareholders. Whether an
equitable balance has been achieved will undoubtedly be reviewed
on the appeal which has been brought by the Commission.50
The failure of the court to extend the announcement rule, however,
presents a different problem. If an insider is in a position similar
to one of trust and confidence, is it in accordance with fiduciary prin-
ciples to permit him to purchase stock at the sacrifice of the interests
of minority shareholders who have not had the benefit of absorbing
the information with which the insider purchases? In reality, the
insider is paradoxically allowed to conform to the fiduciary standard
while acting in a manner antagonistic to the principles which serve
as the standard's foundation. In these situations, the insider occupies
a position that is far from being analogous to a fiduciary's, since
under the guise of trust and confidence he acts to the detriment of
minority shareholders.
The court's illustration of the problems which would be met in
an extension of the announcement rule is equally unpalatable. Should
the courts permit insiders to relinquish their obligations merely be-
cause members of the news media or wire houses could also benefit
48 Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 828-29 (D. Del. 1951), a/I'd,
235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956).
49 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
50 Appeal docketed, No. 30882, 2d Cir., 1966.
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from an announcement? Although solely an illustration, it is illustra-
tive of an "others do it" credo, manifesting privileges where none
ought to exist.
Furthermore, if the courts are willing to impose a duty to exercise
due and reasonable diligence in ascertaining what is material, and
to reveal related information which is reasonably believed to be
unknown to shareholders, 51 can they not require forbearance from
purchasing stock until insiders are reasonably certain that the infor-
mation has been absorbed? The reasonable test is certainly not
unique: Is it now inadequate in determining liability? A definite
period of abstention would be as unworkable under certain circum-
stances as the court believed a judicially applied rule would be. The
Commission has stated that in insider purchases "intimacy demands
restraint lest the uninformed be exploited. ' 52 Exploitation is not
eradicated by the present holding.
MICHAEL RANDALL ROGERS
51 Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963).
52 Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
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